



THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS

AN EFFICIENCY CHARACTERIZATION OF PLURALITY SOCIAL
CHOICE ON SIMPLE PREFERENCE DOMAINS

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April 21, 2004

ABSTRACT

We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence.

KEYWORDS: Pareto efficiency; anonymity; independence; plurality; trichotomous preferences; dichotomous preferences.